But it was a mutation in an opposite direction. For whereas the world revo. For one thing, the participants in the up risings were as critical o f the Leninists for having becom e avatars o f liberalism as the Leninists had been o f the Social Democrats. In addition, they took as their target precisely the dom inant role o f liberalism in the geoculture, and sought in every way to tear liberalism down from this position. T he revolution o f , ju st like that o f , should be analyzed in two time frames: the immediate happenings and consequences, and the long-term effects.
As a set o f events occurring over a period o f several years, one could say in this case too that it was like a phoenix. It flam ed up very rapidly and o f course m ore globally than in , and burned itself out almost as quickly. But in the long run, its effects were system-shattering. T h e d eth ro n em en t o f liberalism as the selfevident m etalanguage o f the world-system led to the disentanglem ent o f both conservatives and radicals from liberal ideology.
The world return ed to a truly trimodal ideological division.
The re vived political right, who were sometimes labeled neoconservatives and sometimes rather confus ingly neoliberals, stood for a very traditional so cial conservatism the central sociomoral role o f church, local notables and community, and patri archal household plus an extrem e antiwelfarism both o f which would have been quite congenial to the pre conservatives com bined uneasily with a naive rhetoric abq,ut laissez-faire that might. The role o f the liberal center has been taken over largely by the parties that still call themselves social dem ocratic, who have for the most part renounced all rem aining vestiges o f their historic opposition to capitalism as a system and have openly em braced the Benthamite-Millsian tradition o f re form managed by experts, plus a mildly social economy.
And the radicals? The three decades following the world revolution o f were decades o f in creasing disarray. A lth ou gh the various Maoist sects o f the early s emphasized as the apotheosis o f 19 17 rather than as a mutation, they soon faded away. T he so-called New L eft move ments were more interested in mutation. As move ments, however, they all soon becam e em broiled in strong internal struggles, divided between those who were looking for new apocalyptic transforma tions and those who were interested primarily in revising the reform ist agendas o f state politics. The latter tended to prevail sooner or later.
To concentrate on the internal politics o f the post new movements is, however, to miss the forest for the trees. The most im portant thing that was happening in the three decades after was the turning away o f popular support from the traditional antisystemic m ovem ents the so-called O ld Left in all parts o f the world wher ever they were in power, which was in fact in very large parts o f the w orld in the s.
In m uch o f Asia and Africa, the states were governed by na tional liberation movements. In m uch o f Latin Am erica, they were governed by populist govern. In the so-called socialist bloc, they were gov erned by Marxist-Leninist parties. And in Western Europe, North Am erica, and Australasia, they were largely governed by parties from a social dem o cratic tradition considering New Deal Democrats in the United States as a variant o f this tradition.
The essential elem ent in this popular turning away from these parties was disillusionment, the sense that these parties had had their historic chance, that they had obtained support on the ba sis o f the two-step strategy for transforming the world achieve state power, then transform , and that they had not fulfilled their historic promise. There was an acute sense in very large arenas o f the world that the gap between the wealthy and the poor, the well-off and the suffering, far from hav ing diminished, had been increasing.
And this af ter one to two centuries o f continuous struggle. It was more than a tem porary disappointment with the perform ance o f a particular governm ental team. It was a loss o f faith and o f hope. It culmi nated in the spectacular and virtually bloodless dismantlement o f the Communisms in east and central Europe and in the form er Soviet Union. The loss o f hope reflected a sense o f serious doubt that the polarization o f the existing world system was in any way self-correcting or could be effectively countered by state reformist action.
It was therefore a loss o f b e lie f in the ability o f the state structures to achieve this prim ary objective o f im proving the commonweal. It resulted in a wide spread and am orphous antistatism, o f a kind totally unknown in the lon g period between and. It was debilitating and aroused fear as well as uncertainty.
Popular antistatism was ambivalent. O n the one hand, it im plied a general delegitim ation o f state structures, and a turn to extrastate institutions o f moral solidarity and pragmatic self-protection. The revived conservative m ovem ent sought to use this sentim ent to dismantle welfare state provisions, and m et much resistance by popular strata seeking to hold on to acquired benefits and opposed to measures that would, in reality, diminish their real incomes still further. W henever neoliberal agendas have been pursued too intensely, there have been electo ra l reactions, som etim es quite dram atic ones, and this in all parts o f the world.
B ut such electoral reactions have been primarily interim de fense measures and not triumphal moments o f re newed social transformation. There has been no enthusiasm. The absence o f hope, and o f faith, remains pervasive and corrosive. Far from representing the triumph o f liberalism, and even less o f renewed conservatism, this perva sive antistatism, by delegitim ating the state struc tures, has underm ined an essential pillar o f the m odern world-system, the states system, a pillar without which the endless accum ulation o f capital is not possible.
T he ideological celebration o f socalled globalization is in reality the swan song o f our historical system. We have entered into the crisis o f this system. The era o f national developm ent as a plausible goal has ended. T he expectation that we could re. But the fact that most people are no longer opti mistic about the future and therefore essentially patient about the present does not mean that these same people have abandoned their aspirations for the good society, for a better world than they know. The desire is as strong as ever, which makes all the more despairing the loss o f hope and faith.
This ensures that we are entering an historic transition. It ensures also that this will take the form o f a time o f troubles, a black period that will last as long as the transition lasts. We do not know whether this will be for the better or for the worse. We shall not know until we get there, which may not be for another fifty years now. We do know that the period o f transi tion will be a very difficult one for all who live it. It will be difficult for the powerful; it will be difficult for ordinary people.
It will be a period o f conflicts and aggravated disorders, and what many will see as the collapse o f m oral systems. N ot paradoxically, it will also be a period in which the free will factor will be at its maximum, m eaning that indi vidual and collective action can have a greater im pact on the future structuring o f the world than such action can have in more norm al times, that is, during the ongoing life o f an historical system. I shall address successively what are the difficulties that the powerful face, and what are the difficulties that the ordinary people face.
L et us start with what seems today the strongest element, but is in fact the weakest link, o f the m od ern world-system: the continued viability o f the capitalist m ode o f production. Capitalism is a sys tem that permits and validates the endless accum u lation o f capital. It has been marvelously successful in doing this over the last four to five hundred years.
O f course, in order to maintain such a sys. It is less easy than we think to make large profits. For one thing, com petition is inimical to large profit mak ing, since competitors drive down prices and there fore profit margins. Any product costs x to produce and is sold at y. Y - x is the profit. It follows that the higher the y and the lower the x, the greater the profit. T o what degree can any capitalist firm control either x or y?
The answer is, to some degree, but not totally. This partial control creates the basic dilemmas o f capi talists, operating both individually and collectively.
Cores and Peripheries in the 21st Century
A nother way o f saying this is to assert that the hand that determines supply and dem and, cost and price, is neither invisible nor fully visible, but is located in a shadowy world in-between, what Fernand Braudel calls the opaque zones o f capi talism. Price is affected first, as capitalist theory asserts, by the strength o f com petition.
It follows that the m ore m onopolized the actual m arket to which given producers have access, the higher the price can be set by the seller, within the limits that the elasticity o f dem and affords. Obviously, then, any individual capitalist prefers to increase his share o f the market, not only because it increases total profit at the current rate o f profit but also be cause it increases the future rate o f profit.
A nd equally obvious, the degree to w hich any individual capitalist can m onopolize a given market depends in large part on state action, which can legitim ate the monopoly by requiring it, or by offering licenses and patents that protect monopolies. This state. A n ex ample o f the latter would be the efforts to impose the use o f a specific language or currency in the world market.
Such actions are sometimes desig nated by the analyst as cultural effects, or the in visible hand o f the world market, but their state underpinnings can easily be traced with a little dili gence. In short, prices are largely political constructs within some limits that derive from the fact that no single state can totally control the world market, which m eans th at th ere exists a socially co n structed econom ic band albeit quite wide within which prices must fall. States therefore matter for capitalists seeking to increase y, their sales prices.
N ot just any state, however, but preferably strong ones with which they have some standing and con nection. Japanese capitalists depend primarily on the Japanese state, but not exclusively. They may also depend usually to a lesser degree , on the Indonesian state and the U. The point is double. All capitalists need some state or states. A nd their com petitors may depend on a different set o f states. Geopolitics is not a m inor elem ent in determ ining the degree to which par ticular producers may or may not increase their sales prices significantly. T rad ition ally, cap italist th eorists, fo llo w in g Adam Smith, have deplored the interference o f states in the markets, and have asserted that this interference has negatively affected rates o f profit.
Since capitalist entrepreneurs have paid virtually no attention to this theory in their practice except. Sales prices are, however, a fun ction o f two things: not only the degree o f m onopolization o f a possible market, but also the effective dem and in that market. It is in part a difference o f time-span o f objective. It is in part the interests o f one group o f capitalists against another at any given moment.
N o doubt this is a long-standing problem , but it is one that has becom e m uch m ore acute today b e cause o f the way it impinges upon costs o f produc tion. Effective dem and is a function ultimately o f the total expenditure on wages and salaries, since at the end o f every com m odity chain there must be individual consumers. It follows that it is simulta neously and paradoxically true that the larger the overall wage bill, the higher the potential profits, and the smaller the overall wage bill, the higher the immediate profits.
The first statement is true about the world-economy as a whole, the second about the individual firms. Let us turn to x, the costs o f production. We may divide these costs into three main crude divisions: the wage bill, the tax bill, and the purchase o f. T he cost o f m achinery and inputs, o f course, leads producers to seek tech nologies that will reduce these costs. But it also pits given sets o f capitalist producers against all others. The lower the others y, the lower the given sets o f producers x. This accounts for part o f the political activity o f any given set o f producers, who tend to act against those state actions that result in increas ing the sales prices o f other sets o f producers.
Re ducing the cost o f inputs, however, may not lead to higher profits, since, via m arket com petition, it m ay merely reduce sales prices, leaving the margin o f profit constant or nearly constant. Capitalist producers therefore spend m uch en ergy seeking to reduce the wage bill and the tax bill. O nce again we must see this as a dilemma. If the wage bill were near zero, no doubt the imme diate margin o f profit would soar, but the middleru n im p a c t on e ffe c tiv e d e m a n d w o u ld be disastrous.
The same is true o f the tax bill. Taxes are payment for services that producers need, in cluding the efforts o f the states to ensure partial m onopolization o f markets for given sets o f pro ducers. So too low a tax rate would have equally negative results. O n the other hand, each rise in the wage bill and the tax bill cuts into the margin o f profit. It is Scylla and Charybdis, and each pro ducer must navigate as best he can. What is o f interest to us is not the mechanisms by which given capitalists marieuver to be m ore sue-. In the last ten to twenty years, we have seen a massive ideo logical onslaught intended to reduce everywhere the wage bill and the tax bill, and because this onslaught has seemed to be so successful, we miss the reality that the recent downturn in wages and taxes has been short-term and m inor amid their long-term, continuing historic rise globally, and this is so for structural reasons.
The part o f surplus value that is transferred to individual employees in the form o f wages and salaries above the socially defined costs o f repro duction is the result o f the class struggle, fought in the w orkplace and in the political arena. Schemati cally, this is how it works. A local group o f workers organize, either in the workplace or in the political arena or more likely both, and make the produc ers cost o f refusing real wage increases higher than the cost o f accepting them, at least in the short run.
O f course, an increase in the wage bill is also an increase in effective demand, and there fore is a plus for some set o f producers, but not necessarily for the set that is providing the in creased wages. W hen such an increase begins to seem onerous to a given set o f producers, and they cannot effectively com bat it politically in the local arena, they may seek a solution by relocating o f part or all o f their production to areas where the historical wages o f workers are lower, w hich means that the workers there are politically weaker, for whatever reason.
Utopistics: Or Historical Choices of the Twenty-First Century by Immanuel Wallerstein
T he cost o f labor in the area to which the pro. This is why such relocations, which occur especially in times o f cyclical downturn, tend to go to the near est areas where workers are politically weak, even tually re a c h in g the areas w here w orkers are weakest. Historically, the weakest groups o f work ers are those brought for the first time into urban production zones or at least m ore fully m onetized production zones out o f zones that were rural and iess m onetized. T he reasons fo r initial political weakness are both cultural and econom ic.
O n the cultural side, there occurs a certain disorientation and disorganization due to the physical migration o f the workforce, plus a certain degree o f inexpe rience on their part with the available local poli tics, or at least lack o f local political influence. O n the econom ic side, the wages in the urban produc tion zone that are extrem ely low by world stan dards often represent in this local arena an incom e that is higher than the one that had been available in the previous rural setting, or at least that had been politically available.
Neither o f these conditions for political weak ness the cultural and the econom ic is inherently long-lasting. O ne can posit that any particular group o f workers in such a situation has been able to overcome these weaknesses in about thirty to fifty years, and today it probably can be done in even fewer years. This means that, from the point o f view o f the relocating producers, the advantage o f the move is rather tem pprary and that, if they.
This has in fact b een one o f the principal stories o f the capitalist world-system for five hundred years. But the curve designating the percentage o f the globe where possible zones o f relocation exist is reaching an asymptote, like so many curves that are drawn to represent trends in a system. The planet is run ning out o f such zones. This is called the deruralization o f the world, which is proceeding at a dizzying pace. And as the num ber o f such zones diminish, the worldwide bargaining power o f work ers increases.
This has resulted in a global trend o f increase in the wage bill. If the prices o f products were infinitely expansible, this m ight cause little worry. But they are not, because o f the limits im posed by competition and the ability o f the states to impose monopolization. The cost o f labor is often discussed in terms o f som ething called the efficiency o f production. But what is efficiency? It is in part better technology, but it is in equal part the will o f the worker to perform tasks well at a reasonably fast speed. But how fast should the speed be? Taylorism was the doctrine that the speed should be as fast as physi ologically possible.
But this assumes that this top speed does not harm the organism. To the degree that it does, we are buying short-run speed with long-run depletion o f the capacity o f the organism to survive. Even as a strictly short-term econom ic cost from the point o f view o f the employer, the m axim um speed in an hour may not at all be the optim al speed over a week or a month.
A t this point, however, a conflict o f values enters the pic. T he employer may then hope to invoke the psychic pleasures o f work satisfaction as a spur to the worker, but that assumes that the em ployer is willing to structure the work situation such that there is som e satisfaction in w ork com pletion.
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T h e issue then becom es a political one, resolved by bargaining power. H ence, defin ing efficiency brings us right back to looking at the political strength o f labor. The same problem o f an asymptote limiting a trend is visible in the tax bill. The basic cause o f the historic trend to increase the tax bill has been the confluence o f two pressures: the demands on the states by the capitalist producers for more and more services and financial redistributions on the one hand, and the demands by the rest o f the population, which we can place under the heading and impulsion o f dem ocratization.
This trans lates into, am ong other things, demands on the states for m ore and m ore services and financial redistributions. In short, everyone has wanted the states to spend more, not m erely workers but capi talists as well, and if states are to spend more, they must tax more. This results in an obvious contra diction: as consumers o f state expenditures, tax payers d em a n d m ore; as fu rn ish e rs o f state incom e, taxpayers naturally want to pay less, and this feeling escalates as the tax percentage o f their incom e rises.
The pressures on the states to spend more but simultaneously tax less is what we mean by the fiscal crisis o f the states. There is a third curve that is reaching an asymp. It is the curve o f exhaustion o f the conditions o f survival. The dem and for attention to the eco logical damage to the biosphere has becom e very strong in recent decades.
This is not because the m odern world-system has becom e inherently more destructive o f the ecosystem in its ways, but be cause there is m uch m ore developm ent and hence m uch more destruction, and because this destruction has for the first time been reaching two asymptotes: the point o f serious in some cases irreparable damage; and the point o f abso lute depletion , not o f econ om ic but o f social goods. We should elaborate on the latter asymp tote. If all the trees in the world were cut down, it m ight be possible to invent artificial substitutes for the uses o f wood products as inputs to other pro duction, but their value as an esthetic elem ent in ou r environment, that is, as a social good, would still disappear.
T he main reason that capitalism as a system has been so incredibly destructive o f the biosphere is that, for the most part, the producers who profit by the destruction do not record such destruction as a cost o f production but, quite the opposite, as a reduction o f cost. For exam ple, if a p rod u cer dum ps waste in a stream and thereby pollutes it, that producer is saving the cost o f other safer, but more expensive, form s o f disposal o f the waste.
Producers have been doing this for five hundred years, and in increasing quantity, as developm ent o f the w orld-econom y has p roceed ed. This is called, in neoclassical econom ics, the externalization o f costs. It is usually defended as the produc tion o f public goods, but most often it is public. T he externalization o f costs is merely the shifting o f costs from the producer to either the state or the society at large, thereby significantly increasing the rate o f profit o f the pro ducer.
Now that this process has becom e a central po litical issue, states are under pressure to consider ways o f preserving the environment. The essential econom ic reality is that any measures to deal with this problem must increase the producers costs, either directly, by forcing them to internalize costs that were previously externalized, or indirectly, by increasing their tax bill to furnish funds with which the states can engage in repair work, or more prob ably both.
Were the bill for such repairs and for the prevention o f further dam age a small one, we m ight think o f this effort as simply one more mi nor welfare cost im posed on capitalist producers. But the bill is not small; it is monum ental, and growing daily. A nd it is already increasing both the profit squeeze on the producers and the fiscal cri sis o f the states, although in fact it is fair to say that the ecological problem s have scarcely begun to be addressed as yet.
If a m ore urgent crisis were to capture world public opinion, say a greater widen ing o f the hole in the ozone layer necessitating a far higher level o f expenditure, we could expect a serious increase in the worldwide profit squeeze and the fiscal crisis o f the states. T o reiterate, there is a long-term worldwide trend increasing the wage bill o f producers, result ing from the long-term im provement in the world wide bargaining position o f workers primarily the consequence o f the deruralization o f the world.
There is a worldwide trend o f increasing state ex penditures resulting from the demands both o f capitalist producers and o f workers, w hich has b een increasing the tax bill o f producers. T h ere is a worldwide trend o f increasing dem and for paying for repair o f the global ecology and adequate pre ventive measures for the future, w hich threatens to increase both the tax bill and the other costs o f productive activity for the producers.
W hat capital ists need at this point, obviously, are pressures to weaken the bargaining position o f workers, a re duction o f their tax bill without a reduction o f state services direct and indirect to capitalist produc ers, and severe limits on the internalization of costs. This is, o f course, the program o f neoliber alism, which has appeared to be so successful in the last decade.
It suffers, however, from two inherent limita tions. The increasing bargaining position o f the workers is long-term and structural, and must le ad is already lead in g to a serious rebound against the neoliberal agenda at the level o f the political activity o f the states.
But second, and m uch more important, capitalist producers need the states far more than do the workers, and their principal long-term problem will not be that state structures are too strong but that they are in the process o f declining, for the first time in five hun dred years. W ithout strong states, there can be no relative monopolies, and capitalists will have to suf fer the negatives o f a competitive market. W ithout strong states, there can be no state-mediated finan cial transfers to producers, and no state-sanctioned externalization o f costs.
But why are the states growing less strong? Inso far as analysts talk o f this, they usually argue that it is because transnational corporations are now so truly global that they can circum vent the states. The transnational character o f firms is nothing new, however, m erely m ore talked about. Further more, this argum ent assumes that transnational corporations want weak states, which is simply false. T hey cannot survive without strong state structures, and especially strong state structures in the core zones. Strong states are their guarantee, their lifeblood, and the crucial elem ent in the cre ation o f large profits.
States are growing less strong not because o f the apotheosis o f the ideology of liberalism and the strength o f transnational corpo rations b ut because o f the growing collapse o f the ideology o f liberalism and the vulnerability o f the corporations, for the reasons we argued previously. The ideology o f liberalism has been the global geoculture since the mid-nineteenth century.
It is only in the last twenty years that it has suffered a serious loss o f capacity to provide legitimacy to the state structures, and it was this capacity that in fact had contained worker pressure for over a century. W hat global liberalism had promised was reform , am elioration, and the growing narrowing o f the social and econom ic polarization o f the capitalist world-system.
It has lost its magic because o f the widespread realization in the last twenty years that not only has there been no narrowing o f polariza tion, but that the story o f the last one hundred twenty-five years, indeed o f the last five hundred years, has been one o f constant and growing po. And this polarization is continuing apace today. But even this consolation is not there for capitalist produc ers, because the power and therefore the will o f the states is slipping away.
We hear all around us the voices o f antistatism. I have been arguing that the neoliberal antistatist voices are in part hypo critical, in part self-defeating.
Conservative anti statism is aimed at w eaken in g the b argain in g power o f the world workforce. B ut the most signifi cant antistatist voices are com ing from the world workforce itself, and these are the product o f dis illusionm ent with the reform ist agenda o f the lib eral states whether in the m odulated W estern social economy m odel, or in the now-discredited Soviet model, or in the Third World developmentalist model. T he growing vulnerability o f the transnational corporations derives from the increased dem ocra tization o f the world and the delegitim ation o f the states linked to it.
The world workforce will, o f course, still struggle to retain acquired benefits that involve state redistribution. But they no longer legitim ate the states, and they no longer expect that reforms will really lead to an end to worldwide polarization. That is why we have entered a time o f troubles, or an age o f transition for the existing world-system. T he argum ent about the historic role o f liberalism and the present situ ation is spelled out in After Liberalism New York: New Press, In addition to neoliberalism, there is a second program that can respond to the profit squeeze: the extension o f the mafia principle.
Mafias are not at all an invention o f the twentieth century. They have always been an intrinsic elem ent of the m odern world-system. I m ean by mafias all those who seek to obtain substantial profits either by evading legal constraints and taxes or by extorting protection costs, and who are ready to use private force, extensive bribery, and corruption o f the for mal state processes to ensure the viability o f this m ode o f accum ulation o f capital. T he distinction between mafias and what were called in the nine teenth century robber barons is rather blurred.
What we can say is that mafias are am ong the most im portant o f large-scale accumulators, and that the top accumulators, whether they are mafiosi or are technically legal, always seek actively to legitimate their wealth, certainly in the second generation. Strong states are, to be sure, constraints on ma fias, just as mafias exist to underm ine the strength o f state mecKanisms? Over time, a certain degree o f equilibrium has usually been reached, whereby the mafias have rem ained somewhat marginal to the overall process o f the accumulation o f capital, and were self-liquidating via the process o f the per sonal assimilation o f the successful mafiosi or their heirs in to positions o f legitimate wealth and power self-liquidating but, o f course, always be ing renewed in some other corner o f the worldeconomy.
The situation has changed today, which is why the world press is so full o f discussion o f the mafias, f. In some cases, it may not be use ful or m eaningful to distinguish the two groups. This blurring o f roles may momentarily solve the problem o f how to counteract the overall profit squeeze, but it delegitimates the states still further.
Thus far, I have merely analyzed the problems o f the pow erful. W hat about ordinary people? It should be n oted at the outset that o rd in ary p eo p le are a very heterogeneous category. They are o f all continents and cultures and represent multiple layers o f real-income level. They are in no sense a group. T h e one characteristic they do share with each other, perhaps the only one, is that they are none o f them powerful individually.
That is to say, they are not in a position to prevail in disputes with powerful people, in matters small and large, by using some influence out o f the public eye, some combination o f debts that others owe them plus their capacity to make real threats to others in the present or near future, which will lead these others to bend real decisions in their favor.
The powerful have muscle. That is what makes them powerful. What ordinary people norm ally rely on instead is either collective influence via the state m echa nisms, or individual access to the powerful as cli ents, or the creation o f collective extrastate selfdefense structures.
By turning against the state, which is the result o f their disillusionment about the possibility o f effective state action that m ight. This is a vicious, downward circle, one we have already entered. This means inevitably that, instead o f relying on altering state decisions, ordi nary people will have to place m ore emphasis on in d ivid u al clien telism and on extrastate selfdefense, or on a com bination o f the two. Let me point out that this is a reversal o f the secular trend o f the m odern world, which for almost five hun dred years has been the story o f the reduction o f the role o f clien telism and o f extrastate selfdefense as ways that ordinary people could protect their interests.
Indeed, the ideologues o f the m od ern w orld have boasted o f precisely this decline, and have often m easured the perform ance o f in dividual states by the degree to which they have been able to reduce clientelism and extrastate selfdefense mechanisms within their frontiers. That boast sounds hollow today, as the trend is being reversed.
For ordinary people, the single biggest and most immediate result o f the decline o f state legitimacy is fear fear for their livelihoods, fear for their personal security, fear for their futures and those o f their children. Fear, as we know, is often not the wisest counselor. W e can see the expressions o f this fear in two obvious realities, o f which the media regularly inform us: crime, and so-called ethnic conflict. L et us look at each.
It is com m onplace to com plain, virtually every where as far as I can tell, o f the increase o f the rate o f crime as well as o f the increased brutality o f crime. This is in part most probably a correct em. As the Thomases told us a long time ago, If m en perceive a situation as real, it is real in its consequences. For as soon as people perceive an increase in the rate o f crime, they act in conse quence thereof, w hich usually means three things.
T h ey avoid areas th o u gh t to be crim e-ridden, which, by reducing the density o f use, makes these areas in fact m ore open to criminal acts. T hey place pressure on the states to increase repressive and penal structures, which eventually overtaxes the system, both in terms o f legitim acy and in terms o f fiscal resources, and is probably a factor in the long run in increasing, rather than decreasing, the rate o f crime.
And they begin to provide their own police protection. Are we still at the center? If so, where are the peripheries, and what is happening there? Widely considered one of the most influential economic and historical materialists of the modern world, Immanuel Wallerstein is former President of the International Sociological Association , and chair of the International Gulbenkian Commission on the Restructuring of the Social Sciences Before joining Yale University as a senior research scholar in , Wallerstein taught at Columbia, McGill, and Binghamton universities.
Details Collect From YY Order a copy Copyright or permission restrictions may apply. We will contact you if necessary. To learn more about Copies Direct watch this short online video. Need help? How do I find a book? Can I borrow this item? Can I get a copy? Can I view this online? Ask a librarian. Dunaway ; foreword by Immanuel Wal